



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

doctrine of the postulates that is founded upon it, — a conclusion that makes the reader wish that the book had been made even more useful by the addition of a chapter or two on the relation of Kant's ethical teaching to his philosophy as a whole, and on the question whether the two can be very well kept apart. Some such careful presentation of the development of Kant's views on the pure and the practical uses of the reason as is given of his views on freedom would have been most valuable, and would, perhaps, have set in an even clearer light the substantial independence (of both philosophy and science) that accrues to ethical science from Kant's treatment. And then again the relation of Kant's ethics to other leading tendencies might, perhaps, have taken more cognizance of the views of thinkers other than German. Still, as I have already indicated, Dr. Messer has given us an indispensable book so far as Kant's ethics is concerned and the important German literature upon that subject; and this is saying a very great deal indeed.

W. CALDWELL.

McGILL UNIVERSITY.

*Kants Revolutionsprinzip (Kopernikanisches Prinzip).* Eine exakte Lösung des Kant-Humeschen Erkenntnisproblems, insbesondere des Problems der 'Erscheinung' und des 'Ding-an-sich.' Von ERNST MARKUS. Herford, Verlag von W. Menckhoff, 1902.—pp. vii, 181.

This work represents an attempt to show that, within the limits which Kant himself fixed for his Critical Philosophy, it possesses the character of exact science and is capable of proof no less convincing than that which the mathematician or physicist offers for his own principles. The scientific character claimed for Kant's philosophy depends upon the fact that his doctrine consists essentially of *a priori* propositions which are of the nature of postulates and axioms. The author openly declares himself at war with the interpretation of writers like Paulsen and Vaihinger, who maintain that Kant's teaching contains manifest contradictions, and that metaphysics as an exact science is impossible. He even declares that, were he convinced of the truth of their view, he would cease to attach any value to Kant's work and to metaphysics generally.

The title of the monograph, *Revolutionsprinzip*, is based upon the familiar statement in the preface to the second edition of the *Critique* that we should try the assumption that objects must conform to the nature of the mind. The earlier part of the work is devoted to an attempt to establish the absolute validity of the *a priori* factors in knowledge.

Under a principle which the author calls "the dynamic identity of reality," he seeks to give concrete expression to Kant's idea of objective unity. The principle means that the objective validity of the categories is the necessary presupposition of the objective unity of nature, and hence is the presupposition of all experience. The categories are native to, or inherent in the self, in the sense that they rest upon an 'elementary log-

ical spontaneity' which belongs to consciousness "as elasticity to steel or growth to the body" (p. 32). In fact, we are compelled, it is maintained, to recognize an '*a priori* organism' with its appropriate '*organa*.' These '*organa*' correspond to the groups of *a priori* elements in Kant's system. Phenomena are for Kant not within the consciousness thus organized, but are rather 'dynamic modifications' of it.

It is not, and cannot be, matter of insight why particular elements in consciousness are *a priori*; but that they are so, is clear. Equally clear is it that, once discovered, they must be recognized as determining the form of all objects of experience, and so of nature as a whole. Indeed, only that is nature which assumes the form of the '*a priori* organism.' "All else is not nature, for it remains unknowable" (p. 170).

Considerable space is devoted to an attempt to refute the charge that Kant disregarded his own prohibition of the transcendent application of the causal category by speaking of the *Ding-an-sich* as the cause of phenomena. The author maintains that Kant recognized two distinct types of causality, — the empirical or phenomenal causality of the understanding, and the metempirical or intelligible causal principle of reason. Regard for this two-fold and often ambiguous use of the term causality, would free Kant, it is held, from the charge of self-contradiction at the point noted.

It is impossible in a brief notice to deal with many of the problems discussed in this work with its numerous notes and supplements. The author is prone to believe that no one before him has fully understood Kant, or appreciated the value of his philosophy. The final paragraph of the book may be quoted as characteristic of his attitude. "Wir haben in Kant einen Geist vor uns, dem kein anderer vergleichbar ist. Er hinterliess uns eine neue vollkommene Wissenschaft, ohne dass wir bis jetzt es wussten. Es ist an uns, nunmehr das zu erwerben und uns zu eigen zu machen, was dieser Kopernikus der Metaphysik uns hinterliess. Es ist an der Zeit, denn über hundert Jahre sind bereits nutzlos verstrichen."

WALTER G. EVERETT.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

*Kant und die Platonische Philosophie.* Von THEODOR VALENTINER.

Heidelberg, Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1904. — pp. vii, 94.

It is not easy to determine the precise extent to which Kant was acquainted with Plato's philosophy at first hand. But, without attempting to give an exact answer to this question, it is possible to indicate the chief relations, both of opposition and kinship, between the systems of the two thinkers. This, in brief, is the aim of the present work. The author's interpretation of Plato is based largely upon Zeller and Windelband, while his view of Kant suggests a careful study of Paulsen and Erdmann.

The first chapter, entitled *Phänomena und Noumena*, deals with the more